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It has been known that heterogeneous networks are vulnerable to the intentional removal of a small fraction
of highly connected or loaded nodes, which implies that, to protect a network effectively, a few important nodes
should be allocated with more defense resources than the others. However, if too many resources are allocated
to the few important nodes, the numerous less-important nodes will be less protected, which, when attacked
all together, still capable of causing a devastating damage. A natural question therefore is how to efficiently
distribute the limited defense resources among the network nodes such that the network damage is minimized
whatever attack strategy the attacker may take. In this paper, taking into account the factor of attack cost, we
will revisit the problem of network security and search for efficient network defense against the cost-based
attacks. The study shows that, for a general complex network, there will exist an optimal distribution of the
defense resources, with which the network is well protected from cost-based attacks. Furthermore, it is found
that the configuration of the optimal defense is dependent on the network parameters. Specifically, network that
has a larger size, sparser connection and more heterogeneous structure will be more benefited from the defense
optimization.
PACS numbers: 89.75.-k, 89.20.Hh, 05.10.-a
Introduction. – Modern human societies very much de-
pend on the efficient functioning and stable operation of com-
plex infrastructure networks [1]. Typical examples are elec-
trical power grids, telecommunication networks, the Internet,
and many transportation systems such as road, railway, and
airline networks. A significant and common feature of these
networks is that they all possess the heterogeneous degree dis-
tribution, i.e. they are scale-free networks (SFN) [2]. While
the adoption of SFN structure could improve the network per-
formance significantly, e.g. a shorter average network diame-
ter, it also cause some problems to the network security. For
instance, it has been shown that the connectivity of a SFN
could be largely damaged if a small fraction of the large-
degree nodes are intentionally removed; in contrast, if the re-
moval is made to the small-degree nodes, the network damage
will be very limited [3]. The robust-yet-fragile property of
SFN is more evident when the intrinsic dynamics of the net-
work flow is taken into account [4]. This has been shown by a
model of cascade network in Ref. [5], where it is found that,
due to the existence of the flow dynamics, the removal of even
a single node could trigger such a large-scale avalanche that
only a small portion of the nodes survive from the cascading
failures. Since practical networks typically carry flows, their
securities against cascading failures thus are of great impor-
tance, and have drawn many attentions in the past years. The
topics had been touched include: Model design [6], damage
estimation [7], dynamics characterization [8], capacity alloca-
tion [9], topology dependence [10], and cascade control and
defense strategies [11].
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Problem formulation. – While the fragility of SFN to in-
tentional node removal has been well addressed, so far the
studies have been concentrating on only the case of “techni-
cal” failures, instead of the real attacks. More specifically,
the previous studies are interested in comparing the extents
of the network damage caused by different implementations
of attacks, while neglecting the cost required in doing so. In a
practical situation of network security, the attacker and the de-
fender are just the two sides of the game. Their purposes are
the same in a sense, i.e., to maximize the gains with the lim-
ited resources. The defender, knowing the important roles of
the large-degree nodes, of course will allocate more defense
resources to them; and the attacker, while desiring to attack
the large-degree nodes, has to scruple about the higher cost in
doing so. Thus in a real attack, the attacker will balance be-
tween the network damage and the attack cost, and search for
an effective attack. For example, by the cost of attacking an
important and well-protected node, the attacker may turn to
attacking a number of non-important and less-protected nodes
all together, while the latter may generate the larger damage.
So, before taking an action, the attacker will do some analysis
to the network security, so as to find the security weak point.
To analyze the network security, the attack usually will de-
sign a series of virtual attacks based on some of the network
information, e.g. the network structure and the defense con-
figuration, and then evaluate the possible damages caused by
the attacks. After a comparison of the damages, the attack
will figure out the most damaging attack and put it into ac-
tion. Generally, the virtual attacks are designed according to
two strategies: (1) Concentrating all the effort to attack a few
important and well-protected nodes; and (2) distributing the
effort to a number of non-important and less-protected nodes.
We call the former concentrated attack (CA) strategy, and the
2latter distributed attack (DA) strategy. It is straightforward to
see that, if the nodes are equally protected, the network will be
vulnerable to CA; in contrast, if too many defense resources
are allocated to the important nodes, the network will be vul-
nerable to DA. Now a challenge faced by the defender is: How
to optimize the network defense so that the network damage is
minimized whatever attack strategy the attacker may take?
The problem of cost-based attacks can be formulated as fol-
lows. Let P = {pi, i = 1, ..., N} be the existing defense of
an infrastructure network consisting of N nodes. The defense
resources allocated to node i is pi. So the total amount of the
network defense is R =
∑N
i=1 pi. In the current study, we as-
sume that the attacker has the full knowledge of the network,
including the network topology, the flow dynamics, and the
defense distribution (the general case will be discussed later).
Based on these information, the attacker will scheme out a se-
ries of virtual attacks, An = {an,j, j = 1, ..., N ′}, based on
either the CA or DA strategy. In the attack An, N ′ out of N
nodes in the network will be selected as the targets, and the
cost for removing target j is denoted by an,j . The total attack
cost of An therefore is En =
∑N ′
j=1 an,j = E, which is iden-
tical for all the attacks pointing to the defense P . In general,
we have E ≪ R. The network damage caused by An is de-
noted by Dn = {bn,l, l = 1, ...,M}, where {l} is the set of
the failed nodes due to the attackAn, and bn,l is the amount of
network damage due to the failure of l. Then the total network
damage caused by An can be quantified: Bn =
∑M
l=1 bn,l.
Evaluating the damage of each of the virtual attacks, finally
the attacker will identify the most devastating attack.
The optimal defense is defined as follows. If the defense re-
sources are distributed in such a way that all the virtual attacks
generate the same amount of network damage, then this distri-
bution of defense resources is called the optimal defense, and
the network is regarded as secure to cost-based attacks. Oth-
erwise, if there is difference between the network damages,
the distribution will be considered as not optimal and the net-
work is regarded as vulnerable to cost-based attacks. Putting
alternatively, if by changing the attack strategy the attacker
can increase the network damage, the network is considered
as not securely protected.
The model. – We implement the above idea of network se-
curity by a model of cascade network [5] (the generalization
to the other models are straightforward [3]). Let Li(0) be the
transmission load (betweenness centrality) of node i, which
accounts for the total number of shortest paths passing though
i in the original network [12]. Define the node capacity as
Ci = (1 + α)Li(0), which stipulates the maximum load that
node i can handle. α > 0 is the tolerance parameter. Once
a node is attacked, it will be removed out from the network,
together with the links that associate to it. Because of node re-
moval, the shortest pathes of the network will be redistributed
and, consequently, the load of the remaining nodes will be
updated. In this process, any node which is overloaded, i.e.
Li(t) > Ci, will be removed out from the network. The new
removal will cause a new distribution of the shortest pathes,
thus generating another wave of node failures, and so on and
so forth, till no node is overloaded in the remaining network.
To fit this model into our problem of cost-based attacks, it is
necessary to make a few assumptions. Firstly, it is assumed
that the defense resources have the following power-law dis-
tribution,
pi = R× C
β
i /C(β), (1)
where R is the total defense of the network, and C(β) =
∑
i C
β
i is a normalizing factor which is dependent of the pa-
rameter β. Without loss of generality, here we setR = C(β =
1), i.e. the network defense equals the network capacity. Sec-
ondly, it is assumed that the cost for removing a node is equiv-
alent to the node defense, i.e., ai = pi. Finally, it is assumed
that the network damage relies on only the removed nodes.
In the current study, the network damage is measured by two
quantities: (1) The size of the largest component in the re-
maining network,G, and (2) the total capacity of the removed
nodes, B =
∑M
l=1 bl. It is emphasized that these assumptions
are made for only the purpose of illustration. In real applica-
tions, they should be redefined accordingly to the real prob-
lems. The key parameter in this model therefore is β, which
gives the distribution of the defense resources. When β ≪ 0,
the important (high-load) nodes will be not allocated with the
sufficient resources, making the network vulnerable to CA. In
contrast, if β ≫ 0, the important nodes will be overprotected,
making the network vulnerable to DA. So, to protect the net-
work from cost-based attacks efficiently, the value of β should
be properly set.
We next describe the method used in our analysis of the
network security. Noticing the fact that the virtual attacks are
divided into two classes, CA and DA, the network security
thus can be evaluated by considering the two representative
attacks. For CA, we will choose to attack the single node of
the largest capacity (highest protection) in the network; while
for DA, with the same amount of attack cost, we will choose
to attack a group of nodes of the smallest capacity (lowest
protection). Specifically, if nodes are ranked by an ascending
order of the node capacity, i.e. C1 < C2 < . . . < CN , then
in CA only node N is attacked, while in DA nodes from 1
to N ′ will be attacked all together. Here N ′ is a number to
be determined by the relation
∑N ′
i=1 ai ≤ aN . Please note
that in a real situation it is possible that the most devastating
attack is neither of the above representative attacks. However,
such a devastating attack, if exists, will be very dependent on
the network particulars, and should be always treated case by
case [13].
Numerical results. – To simulate the cost-based attacks,
firstly we generate a SFN by the model proposed in Ref. [2].
The network consists of N = 3000 nodes and has average
degree 〈k〉 = 4. The degree distribution follows a power-law
scaling P (k) ∼ kγ , with γ = −3. Secondly, we calculate
the transmission load of each node and, according to the value
of α, calculate the node capacity. For illustration, here we
set α = 0.3. Then we can obtain the total defense of the
network R, which in our model is set to be the total network
capacity, i.e. R =
∑
iCi. Thirdly, we choose a value for
β and, according to Eq. (1), distribute the defense resources
among the nodes. Fourthly, we analyze the network security
by the above mentioned two representative attacks, and record
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FIG. 1: (Color online) For SFNs of size N = 3000, average degree
〈k〉 = 4, and tolerance parameter α = 0.3, the dependence of the
network damage on parameter β for CA and DA. (a) G1,2 versus β.
The optimal defense is found at about βg ≈ 1.25. Inset: ρg versus β.
(b) B1,2 versus β. The optimal defense is found at about βb ≈ 1.28.
Please note the semi-logarithmic plot of B1,2. Inset: ρb versus β.
Each date is averaged over 50 network realizations.
their damagesG1,2 andB1,2, with the subscripts 1 and 2 stand
for CA and DA, respectively. Finally, by scanning β, we are
able to figure out the location of the optimal defense, i.e., the
value of β where the two attacks generate the same network
damage.
The variations of G and B as a function of β are plotted
in Figs. 1. For the measurement G, the optimal defense is
found at about βg ≈ 1.25 [Fig. 1(a)]; while for the measure-
ment B, the optimal defense is found at about βb ≈ 1.28 [Fig.
1(b)]. Please note that the optimal defense is only meaningful
to the defender, as it tells how to configure the defense re-
sources against the cost-based attacks. While for the attacker,
by knowing the specific network defense (the value of β), the
only task is to figure out which attack is more damaging, DA
or CA. For instance, if the attacker is interested in a larger
damage of network capacity and have learned that the net-
work defense parameter is β = 0.5, after a comparison of the
virtual attacks, the attacker will find that using CA will cause
a larger damage than DA [Fig. 1(b)].
It is important to note that, in our design of numerical sim-
ulations, CA is always implemented by removing the single
node of the largest capacity. That is the reason why the net-
work damage caused by CA is constant in Fig. 1. How-
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FIG. 2: (Color online) The dependence of βb (characterized by the
point where B2(β) = B1(β)) on the network parameters. It is found
that βb is increasing with N , but is decreasing with α, γ, and 〈k〉.
Each data is averaged over 50 network realizations.
ever, as β increases, the cost for removing the largest-capacity
node is monotonically increased, i.e., E = aN ∼ CβN . This
arises the problem of attack efficiency, which is defined as the
amount of network damage per unit of the attack cost. For
measurement G, it is defined as ρg = (N − GM )/E, with
GM = min(G1, G2); for measurement B, it is defined as
ρb = BM/E, with BM = max(B1, B2). Interestingly, it is
found that, at the optimal defense, the attack efficiency is also
minimized (the insets of Fig. 1). Now we see that, with the
optimal defense, the network is protected from not only the
attack strategy, but also the attack efficiency.
Physically, the meaning of the optimal defense can be un-
derstood as follows. When β is small, say for example β ≈ 0,
the network nodes are equally protected regardless of their im-
portance level. To generate a large damage, the attacker will
certainly choose to attack the important nodes, i.e. adopting
CA. As β increases, more defense resources will be shifted
to the important nodes and, correspondingly, the defense of
the non-important nodes will be weakened. However, as long
as β < βg,b, the damage caused by CA will be still larger to
that of DA. So in this range CA will be always the choice
for the attacker. Nevertheless, as β increases, the damage
difference between CA and DA will be gradually narrowed.
Then, at the optimal defense βg,b, both attacks will generate
the same amount of network damage. Since at this point the
attacker can not benefit from changing between the attacks,
the cost-based attacks are considered as failed. After that, as
β increases from βg,b, the minority important nodes will be
overprotected, and the majority non-important nodes will be
less protected. Noticed of this, the attacker will switch the at-
tack from CA to DA, so as to achieve a larger damage. In the
extreme situation of β ≈ ∞, all the defense resources will be
allocated to the single node of the largest capacity, while the
other nodes of the network can be easily attacked all together.
As realistic networks have various structures, it is neces-
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FIG. 3: (Color online) The security analysis for the western U.S.
power grid. (a) The dependence of G1,2 on β, the optimal defense
is found at about βg ≈ 1.45. (b) The dependence of B1,2 on β,
the optimal defense is found at about βb ≈ 1.75. Inset: ρb versus β,
where ρb is minimized at βb. Each data is averaged over 10 attack re-
alizations. For CA, the top 10 nodes of the highest load are attacked;
while for DA, the nodes are attacked by an ascending order of their
capacities.
sary to check the dependence of the optimal defense to the
network parameters. In particular, we are going to check the
dependence of βb on the following network parameters: The
tolerance parameter α, the average degree 〈k〉, the degree ex-
ponent γ, and the system size N . (The similar dependence is
also valid for βg). The numerical results are plotted in Fig.
2. The general finding is that the value of βb is increasing
with N , but is decreasing with α, 〈k〉, and γ. (For RN, we
have γ → ∞.) Speaking alternatively, it is the larger, sparser
and heterogeneous networks that will suffer more from the
cost-based attacks and, correspondingly, will be more bene-
fited from the optimal defense. Since infrastructure networks
normally have the larger size and heterogeneous structure, the
studies of optimal defense thus is of practical concern.
How about the defense of realistic networks? To address
this question, we have analyzed the securities of two typi-
cal infrastructure networks in our society: (1) The electrical
power grid of the western United States [14]; and (2) the
Internet at the autonomous level [15]. The power-grid net-
work consists of N = 4941 nodes and has average degree
〈k〉 ≈ 2.67, which has been widely used in literature as an
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FIG. 4: (Color online) The security analysis for the Internet at the
autonomous level. (a) The dependence of G1,2 on β, βg ≈ 0.8.
(b) The dependence of B1,2 on β, βb ≈ 1.1. Please note the semi-
logarithmic plot of B1,2. Inset: ρb versus β, where ρb is minimized
at βb. Each data is averaged over 10 attack realizations, just as we
did in Fig. 3.
example of cascade network [5]. The variations of G1,2 as a
function of β is plotted in Fig. 3(a), where the optimal de-
fense is found at about βg ≈ 1.45. In Fig. 3(b) we plot the
dependence of B1,2 on β, where the optimal defense is found
at about βb ≈ 1.75. Like we did in Fig. 1, we have also
calculated the dependence of the attack efficiency, ρb, on the
defense parameter β, where ρb is found to be minimized at
βb. The Internet we have employed consists of N = 6474
nodes and has average degree 〈k〉 ≈ 3.88. The variations of
G1,2 and B1,2 as a function of β are plotted in Fig. 4(a) and
(b), respectively. For measurement G, the optimal defense is
found at about βg ≈ 0.8; while for measurement B, the opti-
mal defense is found at about βb ≈ 1.1. Still, ρb is minimized
at βb. It is interesting to see that, comparing to the standard
SFN model [Fig. 1] and the power-grid network [Fig. 3], the
Internet is less vulnerable to CA when β < βg in terms of
measurement G [Fig. 4(a)]. We attribute this strange behav-
ior to the unique topology of the Internet, e.g., the modular
structure, the degree correlation, and the hierarchical prop-
erty. This also verifies our previous finding of the dependence
of optimal defense on network parameters [Fig. 2].
Discussion and conclusion. – The main purpose of the
present study is to highlight the variability and flexibility of
5the network attacks in the real situation, so as to bring a cau-
tion to the defense of complex networks. Our main finding
is that, if the defense resources of a network are not well dis-
tributed, the attacker could be benefited from choosing be-
tween the attack strategies. In showing this, we had employed
the simple model of cascade network and made a few assump-
tions on the network defense and attack, which, when used
to model the real situations, should be (carefully) modified
and redefined. For instance, it has been shown recently that,
as a balance of network robustness and frangibility, the rela-
tionship between node capacity and load could be nonlinear
[16]. This indicates that, to analyze the security of such a
network, the constant tolerance parameter used in the current
model should be modified. This kind of modifications, how-
ever, will not change the general picture of optimal defense.
The fact is that, as long as the cost factor of network attack is
counted, optimal defense will exist and be an important issue
in network security.
A point which should be specially addressed is that the cur-
rent model requires a full knowledge of the network, including
the detail information about the network structure and flow
dynamics. These information, while is available for some
public systems such as the power-grid [17] and the Internet,
is difficult to obtain for the secret networks, say, for example,
the terror and Mafia networks. In a secret network, the impor-
tant nodes, which possess the larger degree and have higher
ranks in the hierarchy, are usually well covered and difficult
to identify. This arouses the problem of attacking probability,
a question investigated by Gallos et al. very recently [18]. In
that study, the probability of removing a node is determined
by three factors: The node degree k, the intrinsic network
vulnerability α′, and the node knowledge α′′. There a key
finding is that, as the information of the important nodes be
gradually exposed (increasing the value of α′′), the fraction of
nodes needed to break the network will be quickly decreased.
Here, an interesting thing is that, if we regard the cover of the
network information as an approach of network defense, the
study of Ref. [18] and the present work have essentially the
same basis. In particular, if we replace the parameter β in Eq.
(1) by a new parameter (α′ +α′′)/κ (κ ≈ 1.6 is the exponent
that characterizes the relationship between the node capacity
and degree [19]), then the node defense defined in Eq. (1)
is just the reciprocal of the node vulnerability defined in Ref.
[18]. For this reason, we may say that the study in Ref. [18] is
a special case of the cost-based attacks proposed in the present
work. Despite of this point of similarity, the two studies are
actually dealing with very different problems. Simply speak-
ing, the study of Ref. [18] is focusing on the scale of network
damage, in which the attack cost (information discovery) is
variable and the attack strategy is always fixed to CA; in con-
trast, the current study is dealing with the situation of variable
attack strategy and fixed attack cost, i.e., it is a question about
network optimization [20].
Summarizing up, we have proposed the idea of cost-based
attacks on complex networks and investigated the problem of
optimal network defense. Different from previous studies,
here we emphasize the initiative and flexibility of the attacker
in implementing the attacks, which is a solid step forward to
the realistic situations. We hope this study could stimulate
new thinking to the security of complex networks, and give in-
dications to the design and defense of infrastructure networks.
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